Although variance theories (Mohr, 1982) and related cross-sectional research methods still dominate organization and management research in general, different processual perspectives have gained ground especially since the 1980s (Langley, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) . Van de Ven (1992) has defined processes as sequences of events and actions unfolding over time in context. Process theories typically explain processes across a number of levels of analysis, are able to link actions with context, and lead to holistic rather than linear explanations (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001) . Moreover, as Barnett & Burgelman (1996) have required, evolutionary and processual strategy research should be 'path dependent and dynamic' in contrast to static models.
At the same time with the emergence of processual strategy research (Pettigrew, 1985 ; Van de Ven, 1992) , research focusing on corporate political action (CPA) 1 has institutionalized as a relatively narrow but important segment in organization and management research (e.g., Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Getz, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 1995; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Mahon & McGowan, 1998; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997; Shaffer, 1995; Yoffie, 1987) .
However, it is surprising that despite the growing importance of processual perspectives in theory building in organization and management research (Langley, 1999) , CPA research has practically paid no attention to these perspectives. Also, the existing models of CPA can hardly be defined as 'dynamic and path-dependent.' The contribution of this 1 In the literature as well as in this paper, corporate political action refers to organizations' activities in noncompetitive arenas. CPA is defined "as any deliberate firm action intended to influence governmental policy or process" (Getz 1997) , not including any normative assessment. According to Baron (1995 Baron ( , 1997 , both competitive and political strategies are structurally similar, each representing "a concerted pattern of actions taken in the market or non-market environment to create value by improving economic performance."
paper is to offer such a framework for analyzing the antecedents and processes regarding CPA. We outline a theory that helps to explain the interactions between different analytical levels, and how these relations change over time. Our theory is argued to be useful especially in historical analysis, in international comparisons, and generally in evolutionary studies that analyze the emergence and development of behavioral patterns in corporate political action. Thus, we aim to fulfill the gap adduced recently by several scholars (Getz, 1997; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999; Windsor, 2002) that CPA research needs more historical perspective. More precisely, we suggest that different institutional environments in terms of public goods and informal rule settings, as well as organizations' historical trajectories influence and are influenced by business organizations' political activities.
In building our theoretical framework, we first outline our research aim and review the recent CPA discussion. The second section presents the research framework and its components. As earlier literature indicates, the amount of corporate political action differs across firms, industries and countries (e.g., Hillman, 2003; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) . In our framework, the hypothetical research object is a large-scale firm, operating primarily from a domestic home base. The third section includes a historical illustration of the framework. Finally, the fourth section concludes the paper.
EARLIER RESEARCH
The study of business political action started to increase in the 1960s when researchers especially within political science, new political economy and sociology devoted more attention to the issue (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Dahl, 1959; Epstein, 1969; Olson, 1965) . The research focus of these pioneering works was on the relationship between business and public policy, emphasizing the policy outcomes and power distribution among different interest groups within societies. As the political action of firms expanded and obtained new forms in the United States during the 1970s (for example lobbying through political action committees, PACs), it received more attention also in management literature (Griffin, Fleisher, Brenner, & Boddewyn, 2001a; Griffin, Fleisher, Brenner, & Boddewyn, 2001b) . In essence, management scholars shifted the perspective of analysis from government policies to the corporation and its management.
Similarly, instead of focusing on adaptive corporate behavior, scholars started to consider corporations as anticipatory and proactive actors in the political market (Preston, 1986) .
Management literature has focused on three topics, namely public affairs management, issues management, and corporate political action (Schuler 2002) . Whereas the two first mentioned topics examine a wide range of issues relating to interconnections between business and society at large, the study of corporate political action has concentrated on relationships between business and government, and specifically on firm-specific political strategies (Getz, 1997; Shaffer, 1995) .
Initially, the emerging management literature on corporate political activity provided an extension to the mainstream strategic management research that emphasized the importance of the market environment for a firm's survival. At the moment, it is widely accepted that firm-level influence in the public policy process is one of the means to shape and control a firm's competitive environment (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 1995; Hillman, Zarkhoodi, & Bierman, 1999b; Mahon & McGowan, 1998; Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm, 2000) . As specific research topics, scholars have analyzed the firm-specific characteristics and means of corporate political action (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Mahon & McGowan, 1998; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) , as well as the effectiveness of various strategies targeted to influence governmental decision-making (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Lord, 2000; Rehbein & Lenway, 1994; Shaffer, Quasney & Grimm, 2000; Yoffie, 1988; Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985) . In addition, researchers have categorized different political strategies that firms can adopt according to external and internal conditions (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Oberman, 1993) .
One of the predominant research approaches has been to construct a deductive model for assessing which intra-firm (organizational slack, issue salience, past experience), inter-firm (industry conditions), and inter-industry level factors (institutional constraints and opportunities) explain corporate political activity. These studies have been either purely conceptual (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman et al., 1999a; Schuler et al., 1997) or based on empirical testing of existing theories (Boies, 1989; Lenway, Morck, & Yeung, 1996; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999; Schuler, 1996) . In Table 1 we have listed a selection of these studies according to the focus, level of analysis, research design, and the theory type of the models.
< INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> Table 1 illustrates that majority of the models focus to identify only the antecedents for political activity. Exceptions are Brewer (1994), Hillman & Hitt (1999) , and Mahon & McGowan (1998) who theorized both on the processes and on antecedents of corporate political activity. The level of analysis varies but most often both firm and industry levels are included to the models. However, Boddewyn & Brewer (1994) , Rehbein & Schuler (1999) , and Schuler & Rehbein (1997) employed a multilevel approach analyzing simultaneously firm, industry, political environment, and macro-economic factors. In terms of the research design, most papers aim to employ both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
The most obvious commonality of the models, however, is the embeddedness on variance theories. The only exception in this respect is the work of Hillman & Hitt (1999) that focuses on the process of strategy formulation. Thus, there is explicit lack of theories that could explain corporate political action as a sequence of events unfolding over time, and that would address the system-like nature of the process. In the following sections, our aim is to address this research gap, however, recognizing the limitations of our own approach.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The components of our model are path dependency (P1), firm's tangible and intangible resources (P2), its competitive reference group (P3; P4) and finally, the factors related to the institutional environment (P5; P6; P7). The process model illustrated in the Figure 1 presents dynamic relationships between corporate political actions, results gained from these actions, and interrelated forces driving a firm engaging in further political action.
---insert figure 1 about here ---
The factors affecting CPA form a positive feedback loop that results from the path dependency of the firm's political actions (P1a The last proposition outlines the effect of dynamic institutional environment to the corporate political activity. In the following section, we outline the theoretical basis for the model by reviewing primarily literature focusing on CPA and public good theory and deriving the research proposals from this literature.
Path Dependence
Path dependence is centered on the idea that a firm's previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its 'history') constrain its future behavior (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) . In the historical sense, this means that different types of historical conditions and structures create alternate opportunity and constraint matrices for the actions of the various organizations (Isaac, 1997; North, 1990) . According to North (1990) , increasing returns and imperfect markets that embody transaction costs are necessary prerequisites for path dependent development to occur.
Two separate assumptions support the significance of historical trajectories in corporate political action. First, firms with established lobbying organizations (e.g. government affairs office) through which they receive and provide the political information are shown to be more active than other firms on political markets (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) . In addition, prior corporate PAC contributions have been shown to relate positively with subsequent election funding activity (Masters & Keim, 1985) . These arguments refer to a notion that firm capabilities evolve as a function of the historical patterns of decisions (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) . Second, path dependence means also a reduction in possible strategic choices through learning and locking-in of cognitive models on CPA. In political arenas, for example, a close relationship between a party and a group of politicians might create a trajectory for future political moves, i.e. the firm links itself to a certain ideology and group of political decision-makers. Also, it is suggested that a firm that has an abundant stock of political knowledge is more likely to further request and obtain benefits from political action as the involved actors have cognitively constructed models on how the political system works (Getz, 1997; Morck, Sepanski, & Yeung, 2001) . Following the literatures of organization ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) , it can be argued that these models create the matrix of action requirements and alternatives. 
Organizational Slack
Management literature has used the term "organizational slack" to denote a cushion of actual or potential resources which allows a firm to adapt successfully to both internal and external pressures (Bourgeois, 1981) . The slack concept binds together both tangible and intangible assets, including for example capital, machines, resources, routines, and capabilities (Barney, 2001) . The interdependence between slack resources and firm performance has not yet been resolved among scholars. In management literature, abundant organizational slack has generally been denoted as a critical factor for firm survival and strategic maneuvering (Bourgeois, 1981; Chakravarthy, 1986; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) . There are, however, opposing indications proposing that low levels of slack would promote an organization to search for new methods, which might increase slack (Cyert & March, 1963) . This discrepancy has reflected also in studies of corporate political action. Some researchers argue that firms possessing highlevel of slack resources are more likely to engage in costly political activities (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Yoffie, 1987) , while others propose that also firms with scarce slack resources might be motivated to enter political markets (McKeown, 1994; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997) . In addition, Salomon & Siegfried (1977) even noted that firms earning higher than average profits might refrain from political action to prevent negative public attention.
Divergent proxies used for measuring organizational slack may offer an explanation to the ambiguous results. The studies using firm size as a measure for slack indicate unequivocally the positive relationship between slack and CPA (Masters & Keim, 1985; Schuler, 1996; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002) . Instead, studies that have used firm profitability as a measure for slack have noted that less profitable firms are the most politically active ones (Lenway, Morck & Yeung, 1996; Morck, Sepanski & Yeung, 2001) . Moreover, the Anglo-American campaign-funding-centered CPA system is prone to emphasize the need for tangible assets in political maneuvers. This view explains why some researchers have seen such assets as necessary for CPA. For research in a multi-party system, the emphasis on tangible assets does not necessarily offer a valid starting point. This is due for two reasons. First, the cost-benefit ratio of campaign funding is likely to be lower when the investment is diluted to divergent parties and coalitions (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957) thus decreasing the rationality of such investments. Second, in political systems building on local representative democracy, advertising and other mass marketing channels of communication obtain marginal importance because of the locality of election campaigning. In such context, for example, managers' personal networks and other direct, less costly influencing strategies are at least as important than campaign funding thus raising the importance of organization's intangible assets. Thus, we propose that a firm high level of either tangible or intangible resources (but not necessarily the both) in order to become politically active.
Proposition 2: The higher the level of either tangible or intangible resources, the more a firm will be political active.
Competitive Environment
The premises of collective action theory (Olson, 1965) have frequently been employed to explain the reasons for CPA. In general, firms can pursue either individual or collective political action, and the choice between these approaches is dependent on the industry's competitive structure. Thus, in the case where a firm has several competitors, it has small incentive of engaging in political action because political objectives (e.g. import tariff) often exhibit the characteristics of a public good (Getz, 1997) . However, when an industry is highly concentrated firms are more probable to be able to overcome the free rider problem in order to implement political action (cf. Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Masters & Keim, 1986; Salomon & Siegfried, 1977) . In the case of collective action an actor's probability of pursuing opportunities in the political markets is conditioned by the relative strength of the group that it seeks to join or become active in. For example, some industries have established a central position in certain national economies over time (such as forest industry in Sweden and Finland, chemical industry in Germany, steel industry in the US), and the statements of these industries are likely to receive more attention from politicians than the less important sectors of an economy. In addition, this favorable position in an economy provides an industry sector an incentive for political action. Thus, firms tend to favor collective involvement in political markets as long as its representative group possesses enough resources and bargaining power in relation with the state. On the aggregate, the political action of a firm on its own would tend to be more costly, thereby reducing the probability of political action.
Moreover, Baron (1995) pointed out that all regulatory legislation does not have a characteristic of a pure public good (e.g. government contracts, monopoly rights). Thus, the pursuit of exclusive benefits from the government is the most effective political strategy, because it provides competitive advantage against industry rivals (Shaffer, Quesnay & Grimm, 2000) . Firms favor either broad-based interest groups with ample resources and a significant political market share via its members, or small, homogenous groups -in the sense argued by Olson (1965) -with clearly defined goals that make them attractive to specific industries. Additionally, the stronger the selective incentives offered by the prospective group and the higher its efficiency in acting as a club in excluding the benefits arising from public goods provision, the more likely it is that a firm would engage in political action via this particular group.
Proposition 3: The stronger the bargaining power of the industry, the more a firm will be political active.
Proposition 4. The higher the degree of excludability in public goods, the more a firm will be political active.
Institutional opportunities and constraints
Whereas organizational attributes and factors relating to the competitive environment focus on the question why organizations in certain competitive situations become interested in political action, the characteristics of institutional environment explain the targets for CPA. In this section, we integrate the literatures of public goods (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965) and institutional analysis (North, 1990 ) in order to indicate how the mechanisms of institutional environment affect the opportunities and constraints of CPA. In particular, our emphasis is on the dynamic aspects of these mechanisms, i.e., how the changes in institutional environment shape the set of opportunities and constraints for CPA.
Institutions, whether formal (e.g., legislation) or informal (e.g., codes of conduct)
are a set of rules by which a particular game is played, in which organizations comprise the groups of individuals bound by common purpose to achieve objectives. Institutions represent constraints on the options that individuals and collectives are likely to exercise.
As such, institutions do not, however, wholly determine the course of human actions. In fact, through choice and action, individuals and organizations can deliberately modify, and even eliminate, institutions. In other words, actions and institutions are in close interdependence. Thus, instead of being externally determined stable constructs,
institutional constraints are open to modification over time (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; North, 1990) .
Government legislation constitutes a key determinant of a firm's institutional environment, providing "the domestic rules of the game" that determine both the constraints and opportunities for firm-level action. From the perspective of a firm, most legislation has a character of a public good in the sense that it is susceptible to spillins (=contributions of others) and externalities. This makes, on the one hand, free-riding on the efforts of others attractive in certain situations, and, on the other, collective pressure activity an effective tool in other contingencies (Cornes & Sandler, 1996) . The basic assumption for a firm in studies with the public goods perspective is that the actors compliment their commercial activities with political activities if the expected pay-off exceeds estimated costs (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1967) . Drawing on this research stream, management literature has depicted political markets in which governments supply and business organizations demand -either individually or collectively -for public goods (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 203) .
It is widely accepted among scholars that a nation's social and political institutions form the context in which managerial practices develop (Sorge, 1991; Sorge & Maurice, 1990) , meaning that different nations form different institutional contexts (Calori, Lubatkin, Very, & Veiga, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . Accordingly, companies tend to have country-specific political strategies depending on the institutional opportunities, that is strategies are tailored to the specific issues, institutions and interests prevailing in a country (Baron, 1995 (Baron, , 1997 Hillman & Keim, 1995; Murtha & Lenway, 1994) . For example, Useem (1982) has pointed out that labor unions have been one of the business' staunchest allies in U.S., whereas in Great Britain the unions have been one of the rivals of corporations. Similarly, interest groups in Great Britain have typically focused their primary lobbying efforts to regulatory agencies, whereas U.S. lobbies have paid more attention to legislative level of public decision-making (Hillman & Keim, 1995; Salisbury, 1975) . In addition, the identity of the decision maker(s) is an important factor in influencing the incentives of a firm to demand for public goods -the decision maker can be an oligarchy, a bureaucrat, a median voter, an interest group, or a combination of these (Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Drazen, 2000) .
Also, the level of governmental decision-making on public goods is highly influenced by country-specific factors characterized by the competition, based on an assessment of the costs involved and the probability of success, of different interest groups to obtain more benefits and a larger share of the supplied public goods (Brock, Magee, & Young, 1989; Olson, 1965) . In other words, the extent of domestic provision of this public good is constrained by the formal and informal institutional framework (Buchanan, 1968; North, 1990) . For example, in a corporatist country in which business organizations have strong, formalized position in political decision making process, the capabilities and incentives of a firm to control the supply of public goods is far better than in a pluralist country in which several interest groups compete for the provision of public goods. Accordingly, as the public intervention to transactions increases, so does the dependency of business organizations on government policies (Lodge, 1990; Murtha, 1993; Murtha & Lenway, 1994) . Thus, the more resources are controlled and regulated by the government, the more incentive a firm has to become politically active.
Proposition 5: The higher the level of public good provision, the more a firm will be political active.
The emergence and evolution of institutional constraints and opportunities are highly dependent on the prevailing historical context. As noted by Hall (1986) , "the genesis of the institutions can be traced to the events of a particular series of historical conjunctures, some contingent, others systematically tied to the distribution of power among social groups". The influence of national context in the case of CPA is related to shared historical contingencies on legitimate ways to influence government decision making and informal codes of conduct in business-government relations. Accordingly, governmental policies are also prone to lock-in mechanisms that have long-term effects on business. For example, Goldstein (1989) argued, that U.S. policy decisions of the 1930s to subsidy agricultural products and liberalize the trade of manufacturing products continued to structure U.S. trade policy for decades.
This, however, is likely to be conditioned by the stability of the economy and the political system. Thus, we argue that clearly defined formal rules of the game and the enforcement of individual property rights encountered commonly in modern democracies reduce the willingness of actors resorting to political action, especially if the formal rules are in close agreement with the informal rules. Conversely, constantly changing formal rules of the game and lack of enforcement will increase the instability of a society and thus induce an environment conducive for CPA. In terms of the possible gap between the formal and informal rules, dictatorships and other authoritarian regime types often do not represent the "encompassing interest" in a society and are geared towards maximum redistribution for the ruling elite (McGuire & Olson, 1996; Olson, 1993) . Thereby, the formal rules do not correspond with the majority's interests and informal economic practices, creating incentives for CPA. The resulting CPA would be, as indicated already, conditioned by the credibility of the rules in the said autocracy and their enforcement (Harrison, 2001; Mbaku, 1991) . In addition, short-term shocks to the system, such as the both World Wars, the oil crises of the 1970s, and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, may provide sudden institutional opportunities in the political markets. As Goldstein (1989) notes, "periods of crises supply opportunities for new political coalitions to influence the direction of policy".
Proposition 6: The more instable the rules of the game are in a society, the more a firm will be politically active.
Proposition 7:
Sudden institutional changes and shocks will result in increasing corporate political activity.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATION

The Case of Finnish Paper and Pulp Industry 1880-1995
As the theoretical framework of this paper and variety of earlier research suggest CPA takes different forms depending on the institutional context firms are operating, and on the various firm-specific factors. In the following, we present a historical illustration (Schuler, 2002) and takes different forms than previously described in the CPA literature. The references for the historical illustration are listed in the Appendix.
Finland's paper and pulp industry was founded during 1870-1880s when some key technological innovations made possible to produce pulp and paper using woodfibers as the primary raw material. Since Finland obtained rich sources of both spruce and pine for fiber production as well as running water for electricity and for the chemical During the last decades before the EU membership and especially in 1980s, the segregation of political behavior of Finnish forest industry firms continued. The largest firms such as Enso-Gutzeit (Stora-Enso) and UPM-Kymmene became increasingly interested on political action in the context of European Union instead of solely domestic activities whereas smaller firms continued to favor the cartel system and traditional domestic policies. Finally, after the over twenty Finnish paper and pulp industry firms of 1980s had consolidated to three large and two specialized firms of late 1990s, the role of formal interest groups and homogenous political strategies marginalized.
Analysis
In the following, we investigate the match between the framework and the empirical illustration by scrutinizing each proposition in the context of the historical illustration.
Path dependence. The assumption that firms' political actions are dependent of their past behavior in political markets easily turns into a 'history matters' truism (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997) . However, in the case of the Finnish forest industry firms, the path dependency argument clearly stands for several reasons. It is rather indicative how the Finnish corporations created long-lasting trajectories for their political actions during the early years of Finland's independence. The decisions to establish for example formal interest groups (i.e., to choose collective action instead of private) and to become involved in the corporatist decision-making system created a model of CPA for the whole century, and only the European integration changed this paradigm.
Thus, the very first political moves in fact created the trajectory for long-term behavioral pattern. Moreover, the efficiency of these first political 'moves' not only created the trajectory in terms of the political system but also in terms of the level and type of activities. In this sense, the 'path dependency' resembles the 'history dependency' argument in behavioral organization theory (March & Simon, 1963) thus emphasizing the effect of learning in corporate political action. As proposed, the fulfillment of needs in political market during the early phases of industry evolution was followed by very active political action throughout the studied period. Analysis of path dependencies has its weaknesses and strengths. On the one hand, the path dependency hypothesis is problematic as it describes not only the evolution of behavioral patterns in particular firms but also at the level of the political system, in which the firms are only one component. On the other hand, this supports our basic assumption that the process point of view to CPA has to be systemic in order to obtain some explanatory power.
Resources. In the case of the Finnish forest industry, the boundary between the firm and the industry resources was rather vague. This was due to the widespread cartel system and collective pressure activities that resulted in the homogenous culture of the industrial elite. Thus, in many occasions industry leaders of the resource-rich companies had both business-driven as well as more 'generic' political ambitions, which did not exhibit companies with less resources to get benefits from CPA of the joint organizations.
However, it is evident that the managerial elite of the largest and often most profitable firms obtained the most influential and visible position in the Finnish political spheres.
Thus, the resources seem to be an important antecedent not only for political action but also for the efficiency of the actions. Supporting some earlier results (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Lenway, Morck & Yeung, 1996) , recurrent unprofitable periods motivated firms repeatedly to raise their activity level especially in financial policy. One further remark is the accumulation of resources.
Following Peteraf (1993) and Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) , the path dependency explains not only the pattern of political actions but also the development of the resource base in the organizations as previous success on political activity motivated firms to further their maneuvers on political market.
Bargaining power of the industry. The flagship position of the industry makes it relatively difficult to estimate its effect on the corporate political action. In fact, the question was not about the opportunities but rather how the firms used their power. This was especially apparent during the 1920-1930s when largest forest industry firms obtained a de facto veto -right in trade agreement policy, although the strengthening of the labor unions balanced the situation to a certain degree during the postwar period.
However, the largest forest industry firms maintained their high activity level in political system throughout the 20 th century. It is evident that during the last decades of the 20 th century, the political role of the companies became an institution, which was no longer dependent solely on the concrete bargaining power of the industry or firm resources.
Degree of excludability in public goods. At the firm level, supplied public goods could only rarely be defined as exclusive. The most essential public goods for forest industry firms, such as trade agreement or transport tariffs, were not exclusive vis-à-vis other companies. However, this was rather natural in a situation, in which the firms cooperated even at functional level, for instance in marketing. In research and development policy, Finnish government created mechanisms that benefited only a focused group of firms, but again, all forest industry firms were able to get similar treatment and advantages. In any case, the special position in the Finnish national economy and political system created a situation, in which paper and pulp industry firms received various privileges from the government whereas other industries were in much weaker position.
The level of public good provision. The level of public good provision refers to the relative number and nature of the offered goods. Thus, it is difficult to estimate if the current level of public good provision is 'high' or 'low' without comparing to other societies or historical fluctuations in time. In our case, the stable development of the political system makes such comparisons rather useless. Only exceptions were the 1918
Civil War and the Second World War, which temporarily raised the level of public good provision. In terms of political involvement, Finnish firms did raise their activity level during the wartime periods but it is difficult to estimate if this occurred because of the supply of public goods or because of cultural and institutional embedded motivations to serve 'nation's best.' However, as mentioned, the level of public good production was not as important than the fact that paper and pulp industry firms more or less received all governmental support that was realistic to ask.
Rules of the game. Even more than the fifth and seventh propositions, the level of stability in the societal rule setting is linked to the cognitive understanding of organizational actors (e.g., Child, 1997) rather than to the de facto level of stability. Thus, if actors perceive the rules of the games unstable, they probably will act respectively. The question of the optimal level of stability as such is interesting as both too unstable (chaos) as well as too stable (planned economy) do not offer fruitful environment for long-range business operations (North, 1981) . In the Finnish case, the level of stability was rather constant and thus, it did not affect the direction or nature of political actions.
Sudden institutional changes and shocks. As mentioned earlier, the most noteworthy formal institutional changes during the period were the two world wars and the European integration. The impact of these particular events was rather crucial for the development of the business-government relation in Finnish forest industry. The Civil
War and its aftermath meant obviously the beginning of the century-long relation between the forest industry companies and Finnish government. The European integration finally catalyzed firms to focus more closely to European Union's political system in the expense of domestic interest group actions. What is interesting is that the war periods strengthened the 'blurriness' of the system to a point, in which we cannot separate the public and private interest at all since industry leaders temporally transformed to public servants. This in fact means that extreme institutional shocks not only raise the probability of political action but they can also temporally dissipate the traditional setting for political actions. (Getz, 1997) . Outside the described 'ruling' paradigm, researchers have already studied influencing strategies in the European Union (Bennett, 1999; Hadjikhani, 2000; Koeppel, 2001) , national regulation effects and processes (Alt, Carlsen, Heum, & Johansen, 1999; Berrefjord & Heum, 1993; Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn, 1996; Paterson, 1991; Rugman & Verbeke, 2000) , and the evolution of national pressure organizations (Lamberg, 1998; Mitchell, 1990; van Waarden, 1992 ).
CONCLUSIONS
Yet the discussion has become diluted among the various disciplines and publication channels, thereby preventing such progressive theoretical development that has occurred among the network of CPA studies in management literature (Skippari, Eloranta, Lamberg & Parvinen, 2003) .
In this paper, we created a process theory that attempts to explain the functioning of the whole system related in firm activities focusing on the public good distribution.
Earlier, public choice theorists have focused on similar multi-level phenomena but from the perspective of the society and/or the system of public good production and distribution instead of the firm perspective. Our framework anticipates both the antecedents and processes of corporate political action focusing especially on the factors that can explain why and how some firms are intimately linked to governmental decisionmaking and vice versa why some do not. The basic idea was that both the matrix of alternatives and requirements as well as the intra-firm resource base influence corporate political actions and their evolution in time. For example, an environment with high level of public good provision should motivate firms to participate in political decisionmaking, especially when having either tangible or intangible resources. Moreover, the model attempts to capture the dynamics of business-government relations by stating that the conditions for political strategy decision-making evolve over time, and that these processes are path dependent. The changes in conditions can appear either at a societal, industry, or firm level. We suggested that a firm confronts a constantly changing environment across its own history, which in turn affects the possibilities and ways of a firm becoming politically active.
Despite the growing interest in process theories in organization and management research in general, such approach has been rare in CPA research, the work of Hillman & Hitt (1999) being the only exception to our knowledge. Thus, we add to the CPA literature by offering an alternative perspective for research. In the literature, processual research has been seen important because it facilitates multi-level analysis, interpretation of dynamic issues, and analysis of phenomena that are embedded in complex contexts (Pettigrew, 1997) . We see that our theory fulfills these requirements and could be especially useful in longitudinal studies employing historical methods, and in qualitative studies offering the 'language' for interpretation. Moreover, a systemic model of CPA is important because process researchers have been criticized by their tendency to focus on thick descriptions and on non-theoretical narratives. This underlines the need for more developed conceptual frameworks for the development of process research (Woiceshyn, 1997) .
One further motivation to support processual research is the different time scope vis-a-vis variance theories. As noted by Daneke (1985) , a firm seeking short-term profit maximization through government regulation may gradually convert into "a sociopathic organization" struggling for its protected position instead of trying to adapt its business operations to free competition. This, again, may enhance organizational decline in the long run (Nelson & Winter 1982, 403) . In CPA literature, a large part of the existing research has linked itself with explicit instrumentalism that in fact promotes 'sociopathic'
practices. Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) already argued in favor of "...that companies develop political strategies to be effective in politics" and "...that the goal of the political entrepreneur is...to influence policy, and enhance the profitability of business operations." Taking into consideration the recent wave of corporate scandals, it is somewhat surprising that researchers have not taken into account the possible negative effects of CPA. We contend that the lack of criticism in the CPA research is a logical consequence of the dominance of variance theories that evidently overemphasize the short-run effects of CPA. Thus, although variance theories are important in CPA research, and have helped us in our theory building a processual perspective is clearly needed. Such perspective supplements existing knowledge by linking together corporations' actions and performance with the changes in political and institutional environment and in the societal welfare.
As all conceptual papers, ours contains several limitations. First, as the setting is multi-level, processual, and contextual, it might be rather difficult to operationalize in empirical studies. Second, it is obvious that we could add more factors and levels to the framework as it in its present form concentrates on rather few key variables. Third, the framework's usability can be questioned when analyzing political action of smaller and less mature firms. However, these limitations are common in most research settings and offer also starting points for further research. Although our theory can be tested by employing event study and time series analysis, it is even more useful in historical analyses focusing on entire life-cycle of political systems and firm development. By utilizing historical analysis, researchers are also able to focus on other factors influencing CPA, and to explicate the long run consequences of political actions. Moreover, historical analysis helps to observe political behavior that would otherwise be difficult if not impossible to scrutinize. From managerial point of view, the framework offers several opportunities. First, it can improve firms' scenario building by offering a systematic perspective to estimate the trends in the political environment. Second, it can be useful when analyzing competitors' behavior in political markets. Moreover, it might help managers to notify the constraints and possible negative long-run outcomes of CPA thus affecting also the long-term competitive performance of firms. 
